Abstract
The separation design and fabrication process in the semiconductor industry leads to potential threats such as trojan side-channels (TSCs). In this paper we design a new family of TSCs from physical unclonable functions (PUFs). In particular, a dedicated attack on the PRESENT block cipher is described by using our PUF-based TSCs. Finally we analyze the performance of our PUF-based TSCs and discuss other potential applications.
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Gong, Z., Makkes, M.X. (2011). Hardware Trojan Side-Channels Based on Physical Unclonable Functions. In: Ardagna, C.A., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication. WISTP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6633. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21039-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21040-2
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